Click here to Skip to main content
Click here to Skip to main content

Security: It’s Getting Worse

By , 7 May 2013
 

If your engineers know nothing about basic security tenets, common security bug types, basic secure design, or security testing, there really is no reasonable chance that they will produce secure software.

From The Security Development Lifecycle: SDL: A Process for Developing Demonstrably More Secure Software, Michael Howard, Steve Lipner

Introduction

Harlinn_security_part1/HeadInTheSand150.png

10 years ago, most people thought of hackers as college kids pulling a prank. Those days are gone and the US Department of Defense decision to allow the U.S. to respond to cyber-attacks with physical force underscores this change. In the UK, they are revving up their cyber warfare plans, as they are developing a cyber-weapons programme that will give ministers an attacking capability to help counter growing threats to national security from cyberspace. According to Channel 4 News, China admits that it has an elite unit of cyber warriors in its army, and Germany is establishing two high-level government agencies devoted exclusively to cyber-war.

Investigators are usually unable to disclose information about investigations into cyber threats because of non-disclosure agreements, so it is likely that the problem is much greater than what we can be lead to believe based on the media coverage - and that's severe enough.

In March 2011, a security breach made it possible for criminals to enter into EMC Corp's RSA security division's security systems by creating duplicates to "SecurID" electronic keys. SecurIDs are widely used electronic keys designed to thwart hackers who might use key-logging viruses to capture passwords by constantly generating new passwords to enter the system. EMC has disclosed that the hackers had broken into their network and stolen some SecurID-related information that could be used to compromise the effectiveness of those devices in securing customer networks.

RSA is among the best at securing networks, and even they can't keep their most sensitive information out of the hands of hackers.

Who Else Was Hit by the RSA Attackers? Turns out that Abbott Labs, the Alabama Supercomputer Network, Charles Schwabb & Co., Cisco Systems, eBay, the European Space Agency, Facebook, Freddie Mac, Google, the General Services Administration, the Inter-American Development Bank, IBM, Intel Corp., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Motorola Inc., Northrop Grumman, Novell, Perot Systems, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Research in Motion (RIM) Ltd., Seagate Technology, Thomson Financial, Unisys Corp., USAA, Verisign, VMWare, Wachovia Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co. were hit too.

More than 760 other organizations had networks that were compromised with some of the same resources used to hit RSA. Almost 20 percent of the current Fortune 100 companies are on this list.

In May 2011, hackers broke into the security networks of the world's biggest defense contractor Lockheed Martin Corp, and they are pretty savvy when it comes to defending their networks too. It's fairly obvious hackers have more resources at their disposal and that they are getting more sophisticated.

Change of Plan

Should confidential information about customers, finances or new products line fall into the hands of a competitor, such a breach of security could lead to lost business, law suits and even bankruptcy. Protecting information is a business requirement as well as an ethical, and sometimes legal, requirement too.

For individuals information security has an obvious impact on privacy.

Maybe it’s time to be serious about privacy and security. Can we assure our customers that we are creating 100% secure solutions? Unlikely, but we can at least stop repeating well known mistakes.

Authentication

Unless you are part of a top-notch development team, specializing in security, don’t ever attempt to implement authentication on your own – you will botch it, or you are a certifiable genius. Even integration with existing authentication mechanisms is sometimes a challenging task, and there are plenty of well documented examples where an actor claims to have a given identity and the software does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.

Let’s look at a naïve example:

namespace BadAuthentication
{
 public partial class Login : System.Web.UI.Page
 {
  protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
  {
  }

  protected void loginButton_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
  {
   if (AuthenticateUser(userNameTextBox.Text, passwordTextBox.Text))
   {
    Response.Cookies.Add(new HttpCookie("username", userNameTextBox.Text));
    Response.Cookies.Add(new HttpCookie("password", passwordTextBox.Text));
    Response.Cookies.Add(new HttpCookie("loggedin", "true"));
    Response.Redirect("Default.aspx");
   }
  }

  private bool AuthenticateUser(string username, string password)
  {
   return true;
  }
 }
}

As we can see, the user is “authenticated” by the login page, and the value “true” is assigned to the “loggedin” cookie.

namespace BadAuthentication
{
 public partial class Default : System.Web.UI.Page
 {
  bool isAdministrator;

  protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
  {
   if (Request.Cookies["loggedin"] == null || Request.Cookies["loggedin"].Value != "true")
   {
    Response.Redirect("Login.aspx");
   }
   else
   {
    if (Request.Cookies["username"].Value == "Administrator")
    {
     isAdministrator = true;
    }
   }
   DataBind();
  }

  public override void DataBind()
  {
   base.DataBind();
   if (isAdministrator)
   {
    userTypeLabel.Text = "Administrator";
   }
   else
   {
    userTypeLabel.Text = "Not Administrator";
   }
  }
 }
}

If the user is not logged in, he is redirected to the login page; otherwise we test the "username" cookie to determine whether the user is an administrator.

Unfortunately, this code can easily be bypassed. The attacker just has to set the cookies independently so that the code does not check the username and password. The attacker could do this with an HTTP request containing headers along the lines of:

GET /Default.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
Cookie: loggedin=true; username=Administrator

While this authentication scheme is pretty naïve, it’s not uncommon to see something similar in production use. By creating cookies for both the user name and the password, web applications can handle session timeouts. The cookies are usually not named “username” and “password” and the values are sometimes “encrypted” using a simple xor – not immediately human readable, but definitely “hackable”.

How Serious is This?

According to OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks – 2010:
“Application functions related to authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, session tokens, or exploit other implementation flaws to assume other users’ identities”

It’s worth noting that this issue ranks as the 3rd on the “Top 10” list.

Even the mechanisms we have relied on for several years can be broken. Rizzo and Duong has shown that the 'Padding Oracle' crypto attack affects ASP.NET, JavaServer Faces and other web frameworks.

Before going public with their findings – Rizzo and Duong provided Microsoft with the information required to fix the vulnerability. According to Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-070 Microsoft has taken several actions to fix this vulnerability, and provides a script that will help to detect vulnerable ASP.NET applications at this location: Understanding the ASP.NET Vulnerability.

Credentials Management

Vulnerabilities in this area include:

  • Weak Cryptography for Passwords: When we store the password in plain text in an application's configuration file, we introduce a vulnerability that can be exploited, if we attempt to remedy this password management problem by obscuring the password with an encoding function, such as base 64 encoding, this does not adequately protect the password.
  • Not Using Password Aging or Password Aging with Long Expiration: As passwords age, the probability that they are compromised grows - It's also not unusual to see active accounts for previous employees and other people that should no longer have access to the system.
  • Weak Password Requirements: The authentication mechanism is only as strong as its credentials. So it is important to require users to have strong passwords. Lack of password complexity makes brute-force attacks easier.
  • Insufficiently Protected Credentials: Passwords are often sent as clear text across the network and this exposes the user credentials during transmission to the server making the credentials susceptible to eavesdropping.

Storing a username and password in a configuration file, typically as part of a connection string is far too common, so is sending the password unencrypted over the network. Web developers should always use Transport level security (TLS), preferably version 1.2 (SSL 3.3), for login pages, even if the rest of the site does not use TLS. This helps to prevent phishing attacks as TLS allows the client to verify the identity of the server it is connecting to.

Concluding Thoughts

While it has been shown that authentication schemes created by experts in the field can be broken, rolling your own is likely to make your software much more vulnerable to attack – dangerously so. When vulnerabilities are detected in something like ASP.NET, Microsoft has shown that they have the will to take this seriously. They also have the mechanisms in place to roll out a fix, not only across the enterprise, but effectively across the world.

In short, if you build software, and your software can be accessed by potentially malicious users inside or outside the firewall, the application will come under attack.

Many authentication vulnerabilities stem from inadequate understanding of the technologies involved. The .NET platform and Windows provides mechanisms that allow us to implement software that handles authentication properly – learn to use them, even if it does take time.

The “Best Practices” documentation doesn’t mean a thing unless you are familiar with the technologies involved, it will only lead to a false sense of security.

Over the last 12 years, I've been working on Integrated Operations for the Oil & Energy sector. When you mix mission critical infrastructure for automation and your intranet - you make the assumption that the security of your intranet has not been compromised. Based on available information, that seems to be a risky assumption. By further assuming that the major vendors of automation systems is on top of the situation, you ignore that major security conscious enterprises and organizations, with far more experience in this area, still have their security breached on a regular basis.

When it comes to preventing malicious attacks "Best Practices" for IT often balances the cost of security measures against the cost of restoring lost data from a backup. If an attacker can get into the automaton infrastructure, reprogram PLCs' and SCADA systems, the possible damage can be of an entirely different order of magnitude. Considering how Stuxnet worked its way into PLCs', it's reasonable to consider that even the most farfetched of schemes may be worth guarding against.

Further Reading

To get started on authentication visit:

Michael Howard is spearheading Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) at Microsoft - and it's working.

The Comodo Fraud Incident is well worth thinking about, what if they had been able to pull it off without being noticed? How many would believe that something like stuxnet would work - before it actually did?

Mark Russinovich, Microsoft Sysinternals, 3 part blog about stuxnet:

  1. Analyzing a Stuxnet Infection with the Sysinternals Tools, Part 1
  2. Analyzing a Stuxnet Infection with the Sysinternals Tools, Part 2
  3. Analyzing a Stuxnet Infection with the Sysinternals Tools, Part 3

The US Predator and Reaper Drones have been infiltrated by a computer virus that records every movement of the people operating the drones. Wired - Danger Room: Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet

On 18th of October 2011, the New York Times did an article on Duqu, the heir to stuxnet: New Malicious Program by Creators of Stuxnet Is Suspected - the Duqu program was found in Europe in a narrowly limited group of organizations, “including those involved in the manufacturing of industrial control systems."

Duqu is looking for information such as design documents that could help mounting a future attack on an industrial control facilities.

It may, or may not have been China that was behind hacking of U.S. satellites, but hacked they certainly were. At least two U.S. environment-monitoring satellites were interfered with four or more times in 2007 and 2008. Reuters: China denies it is behind hacking of U.S. satellites.

Here is an example of what I fear exist in a number of places: Decade-old espionage malware found targeting government computers[^]

Imagine how something like this can be used to get hold of inside information which can be used to buy or sell stocks and options. Since the 'malware' doesn't do anything malicious to the computer system it's running on, it's pretty hard to detect using the common algorithms applied by anti virus software.

Experts hack power grid in no time[^] - Ira Winkler, a penetration-testing consultant, says he and a team of other experts took a day to set up attack tools they needed then launched their attack, which paired social engineering with corrupting browsers on a power company's desktops. By the end of a full day of the attack, they had taken over several machines, giving the team the ability to hack into the control network overseeing power production and distribution.

People working on automation and process control systems rely heavily on the systems being closed to the outside world, as in closed networks.

Wikipedia defines oxymoron as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. I'm afraid "Closed networks" is an excellent example of an oxymoron.

History

  • 7th of August 2011 - Initial posting
  • 24th of August 2011 - Added references to Mark Russinovich blog
  • 8th of October 2011 - Added reference to Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet
  • 26th of October 2011 - Added reference to Duqu
  • 28th of October 2011 - Added new information on the RSA Attack
  • 1st of November 2011 - Added reference to hacked satellites
  • 23rd of March 2013 - Added reference to TeamSpy

License

This article, along with any associated source code and files, is licensed under The Code Project Open License (CPOL)

About the Author

Espen Harlinn
Architect Goodtech Projects & Services AS
Norway Norway
Principal Architect - Goodtech Projects & Services AS.
 
Specializing in integrated operations and high performance computing solutions.
 
I’ve been fooling around with computers since the early eighties, I’ve even done work on CP/M and MP/M.
 
Wrote my first “real” program on a BBC micro model B based on a series in a magazine at that time. It was fun and I got hooked on this thing called programming ...
 
A few Highlights:
  • High performance application server development
  • Model Driven Architecture and Code generators
  • Real-Time Distributed Solutions
  • C, C++, C#, Java, TSQL, PL/SQL, Delphi, ActionScript, Perl, Rexx
  • Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle RDBMS, IBM DB2, PostGreSQL
  • AMQP, Apache qpid, RabbitMQ, Microsoft Message Queuing, IBM WebSphereMQ, Oracle TuxidoMQ
  • Oracle WebLogic, IBM WebSphere
  • Corba, COM, DCE, WCF
  • AspenTech InfoPlus.21(IP21), OsiSoft PI
 
More information about what I do for a living can be found at: harlinn.com or LinkedIn
 
You can contact me at espen.harlinn@goodtech.no

Sign Up to vote   Poor Excellent
Add a reason or comment to your vote: x
Votes of 3 or less require a comment

Comments and Discussions

 
You must Sign In to use this message board.
Search this forum  
    Spacing  Noise  Layout  Per page   
GeneralMy vote of 5memberRobert J. Good13-May-13 11:36 
Nice summary, thanks!
 
As a note, people should learn from the .net MVC 4 template that installs forms auth, OAUTH and spoofing protection by default.
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn13-May-13 13:21 
Thank you Big Grin | :-D
 
Over in the Q&A section I regularly encounter people who wants to implement security on their own, often passing both username and password in the clear - no one-way hashes, storing both in a database and so on. So, yes, using the various mechanisms provided with .Net would appearantly be a huge improvement.
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

QuestionGreat oneprofessionalMarco Bertschi13-May-13 9:19 
Hi Espen,
 
great article!
It has inspired me to add a chapter regarding security to my article "How to create a serverfarm-compatible login for an ASP.NET application (plus general advice on how to secure it)[^]".
May I ask you to read the chapter "Regarding security" and tell me what you think about my statements there?

AnswerRe: Great onemvpEspen Harlinn13-May-13 13:25 
Thank you, Marco Big Grin | :-D
 
Marco Bertschi wrote:
May I ask you to read the chapter "Regarding security" and tell me what you think about my statements there?

Certainly ...
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

AnswerRe: Great onemvpEspen Harlinn13-May-13 14:37 
I read through your article, and I think you would proably like to have a look at Session State Providers[^]
 
The main idea is to do as little as possible related to security, while providing the administrator as much flexibility as possible - which usually makes him both fairly happy and places the burden of responsibility on his shoulders.
 
Personally I prefer strategies that never store anything to disk when it comes to session management, and Aspnet_state.exe work well enough for many scenarios. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff647327.aspx[^] provides useful information related to the standard Session State Providers.
 
By leveraging the ASP.Net provider architecture you're also free to implement your own Session State Provider.
 
I think Troels Oerting - head of the European Cybercrime Centre - got it right when he said. "There is no absolute security, it is a myth"
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralRe: Great oneprofessionalMarco Bertschi13-May-13 20:17 
Espen Harlinn wrote:
I read through your article

Thanks a lot!
 
I will consider your thoughts, and post an update to the article within the next few months.

GeneralRe: Great onemvpEspen Harlinn14-May-13 12:30 
Looking forward to it Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralMy vote of 4professionalMohammed Hameed9-May-13 5:33 
Good article...
GeneralMy vote of 5memberJMK898-Apr-13 0:18 
Great article!
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn8-Apr-13 3:40 
Thanks, glad you liked it Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

AnswerRe: My vote of 5memberabhishek_jmk4-May-13 6:58 
Really nice Article
Abhi

GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn4-May-13 7:01 
Thank you, Abhi Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralMy vote of 5memberhiphopper01234-Apr-13 1:14 
Nice
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn8-Apr-13 3:39 
Thanks Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

NewsGood and Bad of security policy implementationsmemberChad3F25-Mar-13 15:17 
While mis-implementing security (or even not at all) from a technical point is almost always a bad thing.. sometimes overboard "management/commitee driven" policies can make things worse from a technical or practical view.
 
In one environment I worked, where the password "rules" kept becoming stricter and stricter over time, the end effect was probably less secure. By dictating how many "same type characters" (e.g. lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, punctuation) could be repeated together, the policy essentially took a large chunk out of the search space one would need to check for a brute force attack (which weakens it). It also would make it much harder for most users to create a password that they could actually remember (especially if it wasn't one used every single day), which only forces some to write them down somewhere, instead of only being in their head. The other annoying thing about the enforced rules was that one couldn't create any password that "met" the spirit of the rules, but then had an _extra_ character added (to what was already deemed security by the policy) to make it more memorable (perhaps an acronym of some sentence) because _then_ the rules were technically broken.
 
The other self-defeating issue is when passwords expire _too_ often. I mean if I have a password that nobody would every guess in my lifetime, but some arbitrary expiration hits and all of a sudden now I have to think of a new password, that meets the rules, and I can [hopefully] remember, _just_ to continue logging into the system to do the work I'm suppose to do (so I basically have to make one up under duress -- a great time to be thinking securely I'm sure). I also once had an account on a development test server that had software that I maintained.. but since it was no longer under active development, I would only have to login to system if there was a problem or to deploy a bug fix (neither happened very often). So when I did login I would almost always have to "change the password", just to use it for a few hours, and not again for a long time (when it forces me to change it again). And half the time I couldn't remember my "one effective day password" and had to wait for the admins to reset it. This of course just made it more likely to use a simpler password (that the "rules" check wouldn't let me get away with), just so I'd more likely remember it in a few months (and not be confused by the dozen passwords or so I already was forced to use prior to that). Yes, changing the password "often" does help if someone has acquired the password file and will take some time to finish their brute force attack.
 
In all, some things make things more secure.. but if policies don't account for the resulting "human nature", it can be much worse. Now someone might be able to hack a system more easily by dumpster diving for something written down, where with "less secure" rules it might have been harder.
 
On a side note (since I saw CORBA in your interest list).. many years ago I had noticed a certain CORBA server implementation that for its internal IOR keys it would generate a random portion for the server, but then the lower bits would just be a one-up sequence. So anyone that could get a valid (but unauthenticated/unprivileged) object reference could just change the sequence number and attempt to grab a valid IOR to another object that had extra access. Some time later I looked at it again and luckily it was using something more random.. but for a while it was clear security risk.
GeneralRe: Good and Bad of security policy implementationsmvpEspen Harlinn26-Mar-13 7:02 
Your notes on the CORBA server sounds like the advanced edition of my badauthentication example.
 
As for the password thing - good points; and users get far too many passwords. I've noticed that many use the same password on different systems. If one of the systems use basic authentication you can sniff it, and try that on other systems with better authentication schemes.
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralMy vote of 5memberEdo Tzumer22-Jan-13 21:25 
Nice!
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn26-Mar-13 7:03 
Thank you Edo Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralMy vote of 5memberPhat (Phillip) H. VU4-Jan-13 16:28 
nice.
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn26-Mar-13 7:03 
Thank you, Phat Big Grin | :-D
Espen Harlinn
Principal Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services AS

Projects promoting programming in "natural language" are intrinsically doomed to fail. Edsger W.Dijkstra

GeneralMy vote of 5memberAlluvialDeposit19-Jul-12 1:48 
nice article..
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn19-Jul-12 2:22 
Takker og bukker Big Grin | :-D

GeneralMy vote of 5memberRhuros10-Jul-12 21:56 
A good read, thanks...
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn10-Jul-12 22:36 
Glad you liked it Big Grin | :-D

GeneralMy vote of 5memberEugene Sadovoi19-Apr-12 10:15 
Very interesting!
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn19-Apr-12 10:18 
Thanks Eugene Big Grin | :-D

GeneralMy vote of 5memberLuka11-Mar-12 5:39 
Good example...for absolute beginners.
But if a person reads about cookies and still writes code that follows this logic...he shouldn't be programming at all.
This isn't just bad practice it's bad logic.
And if anyone who actually knows how to program needs an explanation why this is bad...then God help his employer.
GeneralRe: My vote of 5mvpEspen Harlinn11-Mar-12 10:18 
Thanks Luka - it's very similar to something I've found in production ...
>> then God help his employer.
Agreed Smile | :)

GeneralMy vote of 5memberRaisKazi28-Nov-11 21:51 
Nice and Informative article on Security. My favorite topic.
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn28-Nov-11 22:01 
Thank you, RaisKazi!
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5memberLucky Vdb8-Nov-11 22:03 
Just an article I needed.
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn9-Nov-11 0:45 
Excellent, thanks for the feedback!
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5memberBrianBissell2-Nov-11 8:23 
Fascinating... as a new programmer myself, I know I have to really learn these vulnerabilities since many of the hackers seem to know them.
 
Thanks for the very thorough article! Look forward to more
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn6-Nov-11 8:42 
Thank you, Brian
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5mentorKeith Barrow2-Nov-11 0:11 
Good, and timely!
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn2-Nov-11 0:19 
Thank you, Keith!
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 4memberNickos_me1-Nov-11 21:50 
Good article, but, I think, you can write much more about this.
GeneralRe: My vote of 4memberEspen Harlinn2-Nov-11 0:18 
Yes, you're right. I've tried to keep the size of the article down. This sometimes help when you want to get your message across to the reader. Anyway, thanks Smile | :)
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5memberNaerling29-Oct-11 5:14 
Good article. I've always wanted to know about security. Unfortunately I feel this subject is pretty advanced. It is not much of an issue where I work. So I can only practice this at home on my own computer. But being an admin on my own computer and having little knowledge on networks and Microsoft user login etc. security is pretty hard to implement and test. After all, as admin I pass every security check by default.
As a WinForms developer I think I should be especially concerned with database security, code security (CAS) and Windows Authentication.
Any tips for implementing and testing this without having to set up a local network with different users etc.?
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn29-Oct-11 5:46 
Thank you, Naerling.
I often use VirtualBox[^], but I assume that most up-to-date VM's would do nicely. This allows me to test various configurations without a ton of hardware, just a couple of dell precission boxes, and a HP z800 box. I imagine a single laptop would do nicely for running a couple of VMs' - lets say one running Windows 2008 acting as domain controller, one running IIS under Windows 2008 and acting as a host for your server applications, and one or two running Windows 7. A bit of ram, perhaps > 16GB, comes in handy though Smile | :)
 
This setup will allow you to play around with impersonation and delegation in an environment that's pretty similar to what your software often will end up on.
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberNaerling29-Oct-11 6:27 
Espen Harlinn wrote:
A bit of ram, perhaps > 16GB, comes in handy though

Ouch Dead | X|
I currently got 4...
And it seems I'll have to learn a whole new profession Laugh | :laugh: Well, that might be fun Smile | :)
It's an OO world.
public class Naerling : Lazy<Person>{}

GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn29-Oct-11 6:34 
And pick up a copy of Thor's Microsoft Security Bible[^], it's a better read than many other books on the subject - the author seems to have real experience in the field Smile | :)
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5memberReiss28-Oct-11 0:48 
Thanks for sharing - good source of info
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn28-Oct-11 23:04 
Thank you, Reiss!
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralGood bunchmvpthatraja27-Oct-11 21:45 
Nice collection with useful links.
 
BTW fix the broken link for How to Hijack a Controller:Why Stuxnet Isn't Just About Siemens' PLCs[^]
thatraja

My Tip/Tricks
My Dad had a Heart Attack on this day so don't...

Help protect Wikipedia. donate.wikimedia.org

GeneralRe: Good bunchmemberEspen Harlinn28-Oct-11 23:03 
thatraja wrote:
 
BTW fix the broken link for How
to Hijack a Controller:Why Stuxnet Isn't Just About Siemens' PLCs
[^]

 
Fixed Smile | :)
 
Thank you, thatraja
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5mvpNishant Sivakumar27-Oct-11 5:12 
Good stuff here!
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn27-Oct-11 7:56 
Thank you, Nish
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

GeneralMy vote of 5memberjim lahey26-Oct-11 21:48 
Good work
GeneralRe: My vote of 5memberEspen Harlinn27-Oct-11 7:56 
Thank you, Jim!
Espen Harlinn
Senior Architect, Software - Goodtech Projects & Services

General General    News News    Suggestion Suggestion    Question Question    Bug Bug    Answer Answer    Joke Joke    Rant Rant    Admin Admin   

Permalink | Advertise | Privacy | Mobile
Web02 | 2.6.130617.1 | Last Updated 7 May 2013
Article Copyright 2011 by Espen Harlinn
Everything else Copyright © CodeProject, 1999-2013
Terms of Use
Layout: fixed | fluid